We introduce System K, a modal λ-calculus, which-under the Curry-Howard isomorphismcorresponds to a constructive variant of the logic K, the weakest normal modal logic. We investigate its metatheory and its categorical semantics. Finally, we propound some ideas regarding its computational interpretation.
The trouble with explicit substitutions
Modal λ-calculi are notorious for the explicit substitutions that are bolted onto their syntax. This is commonly the source of two kinds of problems: (a) the necessity for multiple commutative conversions, and-more generally-(b) the lack of 'good symmetries' in the rules of the calculus. These two aspects we shall discuss in turn.
Commuting Conversions Calculi with explicit substitutions-such as Bierman and de
Paiva's for CS4 [8] , or Benton et al.'s for Intuitionitic Linear Logic [7] -often need a large number of commutative conversions to expose 'hidden' redices, the existence of which spoil the so-called subformula property. The issue of commutative conversions is known to arise from rules for positive connectives, such as those for disjunction and existence; for a particularly perspicuous discussion, see Girard [16, §10.1] .
In calculi such as the above, commutative conversions are are invariably some kind of structural rule concerning the explicit substitutions. Structural rules are traditionally found in sequent calculi, but not in natural deduction nor λ-calculi, where they are not primitive, but admissible. Their presence in a natural deduction system is incompatible the view that natural deduction proofs comprise the "real proof objects" (see Girard [16, §5.4] ). In the case of Bierman and de Paiva's system for S4, Goubault-Larrecq [17] argues that systems like it obscure the computational meaning of modal proofs; for, if they didn't, they would need no structural rules at all. 'Good' symmetries The calculus of Bierman and de Paiva for S4 exhibits reasonable symmetries: if we forget about the explicit substitutions for a moment, then we can see an introduction and an elimination rule, the latter post-inverse to the former: there is reasonable harmony. In contrast, the situation for CK is hopeless, for there is no elimination rule at all. To match this perfectly, the only plausible "β-rule" one might adopt is actually just a commuting conversion (previously included in CS4 by Goubault-Larrecq [17] ). Its function is to unbox any 'canonical' terms in the explicit substitutions; e.g box yx with y, (box M with z for z) for y, x −→ box y(box M ) with y, z for y, z in an appropriate context for y and z.
Other systems
There is also another, dual-context system for CK, discussed by Bellin, de Paiva and Ritter [6] in their original paper, as well as by de Paiva and Ritter [13] . We do not dwell much on it, as it is seriously pathological; for example, it does not admit weakening. de Paiva and Ritter [13] also broadly survey other, 'non-standard' systems for CK, including those in the style of Fitch, and finally reiterate the need for a better system.
Our contributions
We regard our system as a simplification in comparison with previous proposals. This is not to say that we do away with commuting conversions, which arise precisely because our elimination rule is an explicit substitution. But this does not impinge on the system's simplicity, which allows us to classify commuting conversions, and thereby state them concisely. Furthermore, commuting conversions are only essential for the categorical semantics of System K, so our calculus should form a more solid basis for programming language design.
Designing a new calculus
Where should one begin in order to design a natural deduction system for CK? We shall start from what we know to be successful. It is by now a folk theorem that Scott's rule,
is reasonably well-behaved, and sufficient for to design a calculus for logics akin to CK-see e.g. Sambin and Valentini [33] . By Γ, of course, we mean the context Γ with a placed in front of every assumption that occurs in it. Scott's rule was one of the rules in Wijesekera's sequent calculus for his variant of CK [39] . But, as Bellin et al. discuss, Scott's rule is fundamentally unsavoury: it cannot be split into a pair of more primitive left and right rules, in the manner so characteristic of sequent calculus, which bestows it its grand symmetries [16, §5] . Recall that a natural deduction proof in "tree form" looks like this in general:
But if we are to represent the above inference in the "sequent-style" characteristic of λ-calculi, it looks like this:
so that at each node we keep explicit track of open assumptions. It is then evident that right rules of sequent calculus correspond to inference steps in natural deduction, for they concern the single conclusion, whereas left rules involve gerrymandering with the assumptions. Scott's rule, on the other hand, represents an operation on proofs that simultaneously modifies assumptions and conclusion! How are we to bisect this operation, so as its "right part" can become the introduction rule?
The Introduction Rule
The right intuition was introduced by Girard [15] , in his attempt to combine classical, intuitionistic, and linear logic in one system, and also independently by Andreoli [3] in the context of linear logic programming. We turn their idea into a slogan:
Slogan I: Segregate assumptions.
That means that we should divide our usual context of assumptions into two, or-even better-think of it as consisting of two zones. This idea has been most profitable in the case of the Dual Intuitionistic Linear Logic (DILL) of Barber [4] and Plotkin [32] , where one context is meant to be thought of as intuitionistic, and the other one as linear.
We are naturally not the first to tread this ground in the modal type theory community. The 'of course' modality (!) of Linear Logic is very much like a S4 modality, and-simply by lifting the linearity restrictions-Davies and Pfenning [31, 11] adapted the work of Barber and Plotkin to the modal logic CS4 with considerable success. However, their system, herein referred to as Dual Constructive S4 (DSC4), is sentenced to only work for the a S4-like modality. This is because both the ! modality of ILL and the modality of CS4 are comonads.
Recall that a comonad can be decomposed into an adjunction, which satisfies a universal property. In a clandestine manner, the syntax of Plotkin, Barber, Pfenning and Davies is founded upon this universal property.
Can we follow the pattern of dual contexts, but without depending on the adjunction? Let us take a closer look; a dual-context judgment is of the form ∆ ; Γ M : A where the assumptions in ∆ are to be thought of as modal, whereas the assumptions in Γ are run-of-the-mill intuitionistic assumptions. If we erase the proof term, a loose translation of a sequent of this form to the ordinary sort is
With this interpretation in mind, emulating Scott's rule is straightforward: intuitionistic assumptions must all become modal at once! That is,
where · denotes the empty context. Under the loose translation above, this is mapped exactly to Scott's rule. All that remains to make things work is to add some opportunities to weaken contexts-which would be a structural rule in the sequent calculus-in order to reach the final form of our introduction rule:
At this point, the reader may protest vehemently, whilst arguing that this is not an introduction rule at all: we are shamelessly messing with assumptions! So much is true. But it is also true that even the most well-behaved fragments of natural deduction are not really trees, but involve some 'back edges,' e.g. to record when and which assumptions are discharged [16, §2, §2.1]. The situation is even more involved when it comes to the not-so-well-behaving positive fragment (∨∃): for example, elimination rule for ∨, namely
involves the silent elimination of two 'temporary assumptions,' A and B. Rules involving such temporary assumptions have been of enough importance to warrant their own name: they are known as rules "in the style" of Schroeder-Heister [35] . The sum of it all is this: the proofs were never really trees.
Consequently, our shameless shuffling of assumptions from one context to another shall not weigh heavily on our conscience. In fact, there is a simple way to think about the 'jump' that the context ∆ makes, from intuitionistic to modal. Suppose indeed that we are in the process of writing down an ordinary deduction, and we want to introduce a box in front of the conclusion. All we have to do, then, is to place a mark on all the assumptions that are open at that point. This does not discharge them, but it merely makes them modal: there shall be a fundamentally different way of substiting for them, and it shall be a little more complicated than the simple splicing of a proof tree at a leaf.
The Elimination Rule
Dual-context calculi sport two zones of assumptions. Depending on our intentions, we can consider one of these zones to be primary, and the other secondary. For example, in Barber and Plotkin's DILL, the linear zone is primary, and the intuitionistic zone is secondary. In contrast, in Pfenning and Davies' DCS4, the intuitionistic zone is primary, and the modal zone is secondary.
Assumptions in the primary zone are discharged by λ-abstraction. Thus, the function space of DILL is linear, whereas the function space of DCS4 is intuitionistic. This mechanism provides for internal substitution for an assumption, by λ-abstracting it, followed by applying the result to a subtitute term.
In contrast, substituting for assumptions in the secondary zone is the capacity of the elimination rule. This is a customary pattern for dual-context calculi. Unlike primary assumptions, substitution for secondary assumptions is achieved at once, through an explicit substitution. The rationale is this: the rest of the system controls how secondary assumptions arise and/or are used, and the elimination rule uniformly allows one to substitute for them.
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To wit:
A lot of cheek is involved in trying to pass a cut rule as an elimination rule. Notwithstanding the hypocrisy, this is not only common, but also the best presently known solution to regaining the patterns of introduction/elimination in the presence of modality. It is the core of our second slogan:
Slogan II: In dual-context systems, substitution is an explicit substitution for secondary assumptions. That is, Elimination
One cannot help but notice that our elimination rule is in the infamous style of SchroederHeister [35] , and very similar to that for disjunction. This automatically necessitates some commuting conversions: unavoidably, the conclusion C has no structural relationship with anything else in sight.
Can we live with this? Unless we are to engage in more complicated and radical schemes, the author is afraid that we must. Put simply, there is no good way to do away with commuting conversions: they are part-and-parcel of any sufficiently complicated type theory. All we can hope for is to (a) minimize their number, and (b) state them systematically.
Terms, Types & Basic Metatheory
The complete grammar and rules for System K can be found in Figure 1 . The rules satisfy a standard menu of results. From this point onwards, we assume Barendregt's conventions: terms are identified by α-conversion, and bound variables are silently renamed whenever necessary. In let box u ⇐ M in N , u is a bound variable in N . Finally, we write N [M/x] to mean capture-avoiding substitution of M for x in N .
Theorem 1 (Structural & Cut). The following rules are admissible:
1 Alternative approaches have also been considered. For example, one could introduce another abstraction operator, i.e. a 'modal λ.' This has been adopted by Pfenning [30] , in a dependently-typed setting. 
Equational Theory & Categorical Semantics
The key rules of the equational theory System K can be found in Figure 2 . To obtain the complete set, one should also add congruences for function types, and rules to make equality an equivalence relation. We need not include substitution rules, as the next theorem shows that they are derivable. 
Commuting Conversions
The most interesting rules are the unavoidable commuting conversions that arise; their number and nature was informed by the categorical semantics. The rule (commweak) is a 'weakening' rule that disposes of an explicit substitution which binds a non-occuring variable. This rule has never been considered in the study dual-context systems, for Barber's DILL [4] was a linear system, and Davies and Pfenning [31] did not study neither reduction nor equality.
The rule (commlet), read in one direction, allows one to 'pull' an explicit substitution that is buried in a subterm to an outermost position-as long as that would not imply that it binds something in the process. A variant of it was considered in the study of DILL [4] . It is worth noting that, as a special case, (commlet) includes a form of 'exchange. ' Finally, (commcontr) is a 'contraction' rule. This is also unfamiliar, essentially for the same reasons as (commweak).
Categorical Interpretation
To interpret System K categorically, we shall need-first and foremost-a cartesian-closed category, for the underlying λ-calculus. The modality we shall model by employing a strong monoidal functor-where the monoidal product shall be the cartesian product of the category.
Monoidal Functors
Let C and D be cartesian categories. We regard them as monoidal categories (C, ×, 1) and (D, ×, 1), respectively. 
Definition 4. A functor F : C −→ D between two cartesian categories is lax monoidal just if it is equipped with a natural transformation
m A,B : F (A) × F (B) → F (A × B)
Function Spaces
Remark. In addition to the above, one should also include (a) rules that ensure that equality is an equivalence relation, and (b) congruence rules for λ-abstraction and application. and an arrow m 0 : 1 → F (1) such that the following diagrams commute: 
The Interpretation
System K will then be interpreted in the following kind of categorical structure: Definition 6. A Kripke category (C, ×, 1, F ) is a cartesian closed category C, considered as a monoidal category (C, ×, 1), along with a strong monoidal endofunctor F : C −→ C.
For background on the categorical semantics of simply-typed λ-calculus in cartesian closed categories, we refer to the classics by Lambek and Scott [21] and Crole [9] , as well as Abramsky and Tzevelekos [2] .
Given a Kripke category (C, ×, 1, F ), we interpret types and contexts by
where (a) I(−) is a function from propositional variables to objects of the Kripke category C; (b) B A is the obvious exponential object in the category; and (c) for a product, we pick the left-associating one.
The semantic map from typing derivations of System K to morphisms of an arbitrary Kripke category is described in Figure 3 
Finally, the map π . Finally, we ought to remark that it is of paramount importance that the monoidal functor be strong. Perhaps unexpectedly, this is not only used in proving ( η) sound, but it is necessary in the case of ( β) as well.
It is also not hard to obtain Proof. By the method of Lindenbaum and Tarski, it suffices to construct a Kripke category based on the syntax. If an equation holds in all Kripke categories, it holds in the syntactic one in particular, which yields the required judgment.
We follow a slightly different construction, which we learned from Cubric, Dybjer and Scott [10] . The category C λK has two-zoned lists of types B| A for objects, and morphisms B| A −→ D| C are two-zoned lists of terms,
The elements of these lists are considered up to provable equality and renaming of variables in the contexts, and composition is defined by substitution. This constitutes a cartesian closed category, on which there is an easy-to-define strict monoidal functor. To complete the argument, one shows by induction on M that
Computational Interpretations of the Modality
In this penultimate section, we make some observations about our type system, and discuss their computational consequences. To start, Why is that? Suppose we introduce simple form of reduction, based on our β-rules, i.e.
(λx:
along with congruence rules. It is then evident that, as the only way to substitute for a modal variable in the context ∆ is through the elimination construct let box u ⇐ M in N , a term that occurs in the scope of a box (−) construct perpetually remains under a box (−) construct. Hence, no modal data may ever escape: its fate is to remain in the box. The flip side of this coin is given by the second property: no non-modal data may ever become modal: there is no way to enter the box from outside. On the other hand, the term that inhabits the type (A → B) → ( A → B), corresponding to the Kripke schema, is very illustrative:
Under the reduction rules above, we compute that
So we may actually write terms that, amongst other things, combine terms under boxes. In fact, this goes much deeper, and we can write many terms that 'perform computations under boxes.' In fact, it seems that System K is stratified in two levels: "the world under a box," and "the world outside boxes." That these "two worlds" do not interact should normally be the content of a noninterference theorem, in the style of those shown by e.g. Abadi et al. [1] or Shikuma and Igarashi [36] . But the proof of such theorems requires a solid analysis of reduction, and we leave that to future work. In light of the above, we suggest two computational interpretations for System K.
Non-staged metaprogramming The seemingly two layers of System K resemble the twolevel λ-calculi used in binding time analyses [28] . The distinction between compile-time vs. run-time-or even code vs. value-is known to be expressible in terms of modalities: this result is is due to Davies and Pfenning [11] , who embed two-level λ-calucli in a 'full and faithful' manner in their modal programming language. Even though their system is based on a S4-like modality, they remark that the necessary "fragment corresponds to a weaker modal logic, K, in which we drop the assumption in S4 that the accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive [...] ." Thus, we may think of System K as the logic of program construction, i.e. a form of metaprogramming that happens in one stage. Homomorphic encryption Suppose we pick a cartesian closed category C; we can turn C into a Kripke category, by defining a strong monoidal functor by F (A) def = 1. This, coupled with our conjecture regarding nonintereference, should prime us towards the following fact: if we 'identify' box terms, i.e. consider the M in box M to be invisible and indistinguishable, then, making the association modal layer = encrypted layer one may understand System K as a server-side programming language for homomorphic encryption (see e.g. [14] ). Indeed, the term ax K defined above can be understood as the server-side routine that applies an encrypted function to an encrypted datum. Previous work of this sort has appeared before: e.g. Mitchell et al. [25] embed domain-specific λ-calculus for structuring homomorphically encrypted computation in Haskell. But their results to be based on monads, and hence the monadic metalanguage [26] , whose modality satisfies
(A → B) → (T A → T B)
A term of this type intuitively allows the server to apply any function A → B to an encrypted datum of type T A, to obtain an encrypted datum of type T B. Arguably, the server should not be allowed to do that, unless the client has encrypted the function to obtain a term of type T (A → B) beforehand. This is a requirement that our calculus already enforces.
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Conclusion & Further Directions
We have defined a dual-context system, and shown that it satisfies basic metatheoretic results, as well as soundness and categorical completeness for Kripke categories. In conclusion, we hinted at two possible computational interpretations, program construction and homomorphic encryption.
The most immediate direction is a serious study of reduction. We have not, unfortunately, avoided commuting conversions, which complicates things. Previous research by Ohta and Hasegawa [29] on the reduction of DILL is reasonably clear and thorough, and so should suffice a solid start point for this purpose.
Subsequently, it would be interesting to investigate nonintereference properties. It should be sufficient to produce an argument based on logical relations, using techinques similar to those of Shikuma and Igarashi [36] . Such a property should pave the way to understanding the applications of System K to various problems of programming language design.
